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Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is an increasingly popular method for 
securing many forms of data and communication via public key encryption.  
The algorithm utilizes key parameters, referred to as the domain parameters.  
These parameters must adhere to specific characteristics in order to be valid 
for use in the algorithm.  
 
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), in ANSI X9.62, provides 
the process for generating and validating these parameters.   The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has identified fifteen sets of 
parameters; five for prime fields, five for binary fields, and five for Koblitz 
curves. 
 
The parameter generation and validation processes have several key issues.  
The first is the fast reduction within the proper modulus.  The modulus chosen 
is an irreducible polynomial having degree greater than 160.  Choosing 
irreducible polynomials of a particular order is less critical since they have 
isomorphic properties, mathematically.  However, since there are differences 
in performance, there are standards that determine the specific polynomials 
chosen.  The NIST standards are also based on word lengths of 32 bits.  
Processor architecture, primality, and validation of irreducibility are other 
important characteristics. 
 
The area of ECC that is researched is the generation and validation processes, 
as they are specified for binary Galois Fields F (2m). The rationale for the 
parameters, as computed for 32 bit and 64 bit computer architectures, and the 
algorithms used for implementation, as specified by ANSI, NIST and others, 
are examined.  The methods for fast reduction are also examined as a baseline 
for understanding these parameters.  Another aspect of the research is to 
determine a set of parameters beyond the 571-bit length that meet the 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the generation and validation of the 
domain parameters for elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), in particular as 
defined by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standards, as well as 
by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the Secure and 
Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG), for binary Galois fields.  Conditions, 
such as primality, randomness, irreducibility, point counting, and fast 
reduction are essential characteristics of elliptic curve cryptography.  The 
standard algorithms for generating and validating parameters are researched 
for implementation, after a thorough understanding of the processes associated 
for verifiably random parameters.   
 
The federal standards for elliptic curves, associated with cryptography, are 
rather difficult to understand and raise several questions.  How are the domain 
parameters generated?  Why are there only five set of parameters defined for 
binary Galois fields and five for Koblitz curves?  What are all the essential 
criteria for choosing the domain parameters?  Are there other useful 
parameters that are available that meet the necessary criteria?  And, with 
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several published documents identifying the “standards,” then what is the real 
standard? 
 
Elliptic curves are denoted by specific points that statisfy the elliptic curve 
equations. Having a method to determining the number of valid points on an 
elliptic curve, in binary Galois fields, is important for understanding the level 
of difficulty an attacker would have in attempting to break ECC.  It is also 
essential in computing the order of the elliptic curve.  We implement an 
algorithm, similar to a Lucas sequence [8], which computes the number of 
points on Koblitz curves, determine which other field sizes could potentially 
be useful as a domain parameter. 
 
Since the testing of ECC must follow the Security Requirements for 
Cryptographic Modules, which is published by the U.S. Dept. of Commerce 
and NIST, these publications establish the criteria for security [35].  In 
addition, the ANSI standard [22] defines two security criteria, the MOV and 
Anomalous conditions.  We examine how the domain parameters are affected 
and impacted by compliance to these conditions.  More specifically, these 
conditions are stepped through for approved domain parameters to gain an 
understanding of the criteria necessary for new domain parameters generation.  
The U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Department of Commerce Security 
Requirements [33], notes that software based cryptography only meets level 1 
security standards.  Beyond level 1 security requires methods and techniques 
of securing hardware and encryption at the hardware level itself, and are not 
analyzed further during research. 
 
Lastly, a brief description of the criteria for a hash algorithm is described in 
order to understand what is necessary for an eventual replacement to the SHA-
1 and SHA-2 hash algorithms [19].  In order to gain a clearer understanding of 
the elliptic curve algorithm, as it is used for digital signatures, several 
characteristics are identified.  These characteristics include parameters and 
associations within the context of key generation, encryption, signatures and 
authentication, and the associated verifications.  For this purpose, the ANSI 
X9.62 standards are a critical standard that provides the necessary 
information.  The ANSI standard along with the NIST 186-2 and IEEE 
standards provide the global perspective, standards and federally accepted 
parameters for the ECC algorithm [22, 26, 35]. 
 
The ANSI X9.62 standard [22] describes the elliptic curve algorithm as it 
pertains to the following: 
• Creating elliptic curve parameters 
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• Validation of the parameters 
• Key pair generation and validation 
• Signature generation and implementation 
• Authentication of the signature 
 

















Figure 1: ANSI X9.62 Protocol for Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
 
Since the binary Galois fields, (F (2m)), are the most important due to their 
implementation with hardware and binary processing, their associated domain 
parameters for ECC are examined.  This is a special case of the optimal 
extension field, (F (pm)), where the prime value p=2 [1].  The prime field case 
occurs when m=1.  In the binary Galois field, the output can be given with 
respect to two particular bases, polynomial basis and the normal basis.  FIPS 
186-2 provides an algorithm for the conversion between the polynomial basis 
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Basics of Elliptic Curves 
 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a public key cryptographic system (PKCS) 
which utilizes points on elliptic curves.  These points can be represented 
graphically in a two-dimensional plane, or a toroid [4, 6].  Elliptic curves are 
based on the following equation, known as the generic Weierstrass equation: 
 
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6                   (1) 
 
The mathematics associated with ECC is performed in prime fields, binary 
fields, or optimal extended fields. Real numbers are used mainly for examples 
and understanding the fundamentals of the algorithm.  Prime field and binary 
fields are specific conditions of the optimal extended field space [1].   
 
Prime fields, denoted by F (p), utilizes the following variation of equation (1) 
to generate the necessary elliptic curve. 
 
        y2 = x3+ ax + b mod (p);  where 4a3 + 27b2 ≠ 0   (2) 
 
Binary field space, denoted by F (2m), utilizes the following variation of 
equation (1) to generate the associated elliptic curves. 
 
y2 + xy = x3+ ax2 + b mod (2m); where b ≠ 0   (3) 
 
In addition to the specific equation for usage in binary fields, there is a normal 
and a polynomial basis that is utilized with a particular encryption method.  
For polynomial basis, field elements are reduced by the irreducible 
polynomial modulus.   The modulus will be inferred, but not shown in 
following equations.  There is a conversion algorithm that can convert from 
one basis to the other. 
 
In the process to generate the elliptic curves, encrypting and decrypting data, 
generating key pairs, signatures and authentication, several parameters are 
needed.  These are the domain parameters.  NIST, IEEE and ANSI provided 
the federally accepted standard parameters for ECC.  These associated 
parameters are considerably smaller than those defined by the RSA algorithm, 
and ECC provides greater levels of security with less overhead.  However, 
there is only a small sets of recommended values for the various fields.  For 
the binary field, there are only five set of parameters specified by NIST as 
standards for various security levels of encryption, not including the five 
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associated for the Kolbitz curves [35].  These parameters have been chosen 
for fast reduction with their respective modulo [1]. 
 
Elliptic Curve Mathematics 
 
In order to understand the mathematics associated with elliptic curves, a 
preliminary examination of the Group Laws will be described as they apply to 
finite and infinite fields [6].  As stated earlier, the elliptic curve equation in 
prime fields is as follows: 
 
y2  = x3+ ax + b;  where 4a3 + 27b2 ≠ 0 
 
Elliptic Curve Mathematics for Prime Fields 
Figure 2 shows a basic elliptic curve in a real field.  It is used to emphasize the 
mathematical concepts.  Points on an elliptic curve are governed by certain 
rules [6].  These are the following Group Laws. 
 
 
Figure 2: Elliptic Curve (y2 = x3-4x +2) 
 
1. P + ∞  = P where ∞  is the “infinity point.”  
 




Figure 3: Point P and the Negative of P 
 
3. If P = (xP, yP) and Q = (xQ, yQ) with P ≠ -Q and P ≠ Q, then  
R = P + Q = (xR, yR), given by: 
           xR = λ2 - xP - xQ,, yR = λ(xP - xR) - yP 
 where 
 
      
 
 
Figure 4: Addition of Points P, Q 
 
4. For point doubling, if P = (xP, yP) then R = 2P = (xP, yP) + (xR, yR) 
given by: 
xR = λ2 - 2xP,   yR = λ(xP - xR) - yP    
 















Example:   For F (11) 
  P = (1, 3) for elliptic curve: y2  = x3+ 1x + 7 (mod 11) 




All of the viable points on an elliptic curve can be graphed in a two-
dimensional plane, whose dimensions are p-1 by p-1.  Viable points are those 
which solve the elliptic curve equation.  Along with any set of points, the 
infinity point is also to be accounted for. 
 
Figure 5 shows the set of points, excluding (∞, ∞), for the elliptic curve:  
 
y2  = x3+ 1x + 7 (mod 139) 
 
Figure 5: Points for: y2  = x3+ 1x + 7 (mod 139) 
 
These points can be represented not only in a two-dimensional plane, but 
since they are associated with a modulus, the plane can be seen as a toroid.  
The toroid is created by bringing the top and bottom edges together, and then 
similarly, bringing the right and left sides together.  The end result is a toroid, 
as the one represented in Figure 6, showing all of the points on a partially 








Figure 7: Toroid of Points for: y2  = x3+ 1x + 7 (mod 31) 
 
Figure 7 shows the point on the same elliptic curve taken with a different 
modulus.  The mesh of the figure shows the two-dimensional characteristics 
of the plane as they were wrapped around to create the toroid. 
 
Elliptic Curve Mathematics for Binary Galois Fields 
The mathematics associated with elliptic curves is also performed using 
mathematic techniques that apply to binary fields (F (2m)) [6]. As stated 
earlier, the elliptic curve equation in binary field space is: 
 
   y2 + xy = x3+ ax + b; where b ≠ 0 
 
The first three group laws are repeated for completeness, as associated with 
binary Galois fields.  The details of point doubling are shown below. 
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Recalling:   y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6  
And for non-supersingular curves: a1 = 1, a2 = a, a3 = 0, a4 = 0, a6 = b 
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b 
 
1. P + ∞  = P where ∞  is the “infinity point” 
 
2. If P = (xP, yP), then (xP, yP) + (xP, - a1 xP - a3 - yP) = ∞ .    
-P = (xP, - a1 x - a3 - yP), or (xP, - xP - yP);  
 
3. If P = (xP, yP) and Q = (xQ, yQ) with P ≠ -Q and P ≠ Q, then  
R = -R’= (xR, yR), given by: 
 





and since  xR = xR’   
 
R= (xR , - xR - yR’). 
 
4. Point Doubling 
 
Base Equation: y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b  
 
Rearranging the equation: y2 + xy + x3 + ax2 + b = 0 
 











































A line through a point, P = (x0, y0), has the following y value: 
 
By substitution, 
0 = (λx+b)2 + x(λx+b) + x3 + a2x2 + a6  = x3 + (λ2+λ+a2 )x2 + … 
 
which is similar to the root of elliptic curve in F(p). 
 





Doubling P0 = (x0, y0) gives P1 = (x1, y1) = -2P having the following values: 
    
 
 




For binary Galois fields, using the generic Weierstrass equation, the negative 
of a point P, denoted by (xP, yP), is (xP, -a1xP-a3-yP) [6]. 
A solid understanding of the mathematics of elliptic curves is essential to 
understanding the generation of parameters associated with elliptic curve 
cryptography. 
! 
























































































































Polynomial and Normal Bases 
 
There are two baselines for representing elliptic curve information and 
parameter data. They are polynomial basis and normal basis.   
 
The polynomial basis interprets each element of a binary Galois field as 
though it were a binary polynomial.  They are represented as binary numbers, 
















The elements of the associated field, F (2m), are also held to the constraint that 
they are reduced by an irreducible polynomial, known as a reduction 
polynomial [1].  An irreducible polynomial is a polynomial that cannot be 
factored to anything other than 1 and itself.  The reduction polynomial, f(x), is 
a polynomial whose highest degree is that of the field, m.  This polynomial 
can be in two particular forms, trinomial or pentanomial [1]. 
 
! 













The condition for the polynomial to be chosen as the designated irreducible 
polynomial of the associated degree is the following.  The value m is the same 
as the degree of the field.  For a trinomial, the value for k, is the smallest k that 
exists of the available irreducible polynomials of that degree.  For the 
pentanomials, k3, is chosen as the smallest available k3 such that k3 >k2 >k1 
[1]. For example, both of the following polynomials are of degree 8.  
However, the one denoted on the bottom is the irreducible polynomial, since it 
meets the criteria mentioned earlier.  A listing of irreducible polynomials, of 
the type described above, trinomial and pentanomial, are provided in 
Appendix C, from FIPS 186-2 [35]. 
f(x) = x8 + x6 + x5 + x + 1 [2] 




Normal basis elements are represented a little differently.  They have the 
advantage in implementation of squaring.  This mathematical function is 
applied efficiently [22].  They have the following form. 
 
! 




}  and 
! 
{" # F(2m )}  
 
Deciding upon a basis to use is not essential, as long as it is consistent, and 
that the recipient of the parameters knows what the basis is.  The reason for 
this is that the basis have conversions associated with them.  One can switch 
from a normal basis to a polynomial basis, and vice versa by means of a 
conversion matrix.  Each conversion matrix is based on the degree of the field.  
The matrix is an m-by-m matrix whose rows are calculated with the modulus 
of the reduction polynomial [26]. 
 
Basis Conversion 
An essential component of elliptic curve parameter generation is the ability to 
convert elements from one basis to another.  This is done by means of a 
conversion matrix [22, 26, 35]. 
 
A conversion matrix, Γ1, is an m-by-m matrix composed of {0, 1}.  NIST 
provides a row, β, for the conversion matrix associated for the five standards.    
Subsequent rows are easily calculated within the given modulus, the modulus 
being the irreducible polynomial [35]. 
 
Conversion from a normal basis to polynomial basis is calculated by matrix 







where n is the bit-string of the normal basis element, and p is the resulting 
polynomial basis representation of the normal element.  Γ1 is constructed by a 
series of squaring and reduction algorithms.  Starting with theβ, each 
following row’s values are obtained by squaring the previous row and 
































































Conversion from a polynomial basis to normal basis is calculated also by 





= n  
 
However, the input bit-string is in reverse sequential order.  The highest order 
bit is on the right, and the lowest order bit is on the left.  The conversion 
matrix is the inverse of the normal-to-polynomial conversion matrix.  NIST 




























In both cases, the result is an m length bit-string representing the input 
element in the opposite basis. 
 
Unlike simply finding the value for β, computing β and the conversion matrix 
for an arbitrarily chosen field requires several steps.  These steps utilize 






The general elliptic curve equation for binary Galois fields is of the form: 
 
y2 + xy = x3+ ax + b; where b ≠ 0. 
 
The equation for Koblitz curve takes on one of the following forms: 
 
 15 
y2 + xy = x3+ x2 + 1 
 
y2 + xy = x3 + 1 
 
Koblitz curves, which are also known as anomalous binary curves [1], provide 
an efficient means for implementation and computation, especially with 
respect to multiplication.  Point doubling employs the usual means by which 
multiplication is performed.  However, with Kobitz curves, there is no special 
point doubling. 
 
Computing the order for Koblitz curves is calculated very quickly.  The order 
is valid only for certain prime values associated with the degree of the field.  
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Identification of the Domain Parameters F (2m) 
 
An elliptic curve has several parameters associated with it so as to define it.  
Points on an elliptic curve also are characteristic of a particular elliptic curve.  
Federal standards dictate what the associated domain parameters are for 
specific elliptic curves.  Those standards allow for simplified implementation 
of elliptic curve standards for cryptography and signatures (ECDSA), without 
having to create a new set of parameters which must be validated.   
 
The parameters that are used in F (2m) are specified in several important 
published standards, such as ANSI X9.62, NIST FIPS 186-2, and SECG-2. 
The following is extracted from X9.62-1998 [37].  These descriptions of 
parameters are also valid in X9.62-2005 [22].  However, the current ANSI 
standard denotes that parameters, which complied with the old standard, are 
considered invalid under the new standard.  
 






5.1.2.1    Elliptic curve domain parameters over F(2m) 
Elliptic curve domain parameters over F(2m)shall consist of the following 
parameters: 
1. A field size q=2m which defines the underlying finite field F q, an indication 
of the basis used to represent the elements of the field (TPB, PPB or GNB), 
and a reduction polynomial of degree m over F  2 if the basis used is a TPB 
or PPB; 
2. (Optional) A bit string SEED of length at least 160 bits, if the elliptic curve 
was randomly generated in accordance with Annex A.3.3; 
3. Two field elements a and b in F q which define the equation of the elliptic 
curve E:  
    y2 + xy = x3+ ax + b; 
4. Two field elements xG and yG in F q which define a point G = (xG, yG) of 
prime order on E (note G ≠ O); 
5. The order n of the point G (it must be the case than n>2160 and n>4√q); and 
6. (Optional) The cofactor h = #E(F q)/n. 
Annex A.3.2 specifies the method that shall be used for generating an elliptic 
curve E over F q and the point G of order n. 
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Figure 9: Definition of Elliptic Curve Parameters (ANSI X9.62-2005)[22] 
 
Therefore, for binary Galois fields, where an elliptic curve is defined as: 
 
E :    y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b. 
 
The parameters that are needed are the following [1]: 
 
1. m = field size and power or the leading x of the    
 irreducible polynomial 
2. f(x) = irreducible polynomial modulus for polynomial basis 
3. a = coefficient for the elliptic curve equation 
4. b = coefficient for the elliptic curve equation 
5. P = (xp, yp), a point on the elliptic curve 
6. n = the order of the point, P 
7. h = the cofactor, such that h = #E(F (2m) )/ n 
h ∈ { 2, 4 } 
8. s = seed for the hash function for random parameter generation  
 
 
Criteria for Domain Parameters 
 
Domain parameters are chosen based on certain security and performance 
criteria.  These criteria are based on the needs of the encryption (the level 
chosen), and the types of possible attacks that can be instigated on an elliptic 
curve cryptosystem.  These attacks, the MOV and Anomalous attacks will be 
discussed [22, 35]. 
 
The values for the approved security levels are approximately half of the 
minimum bit-length of the value for the order.  This is based on the NIST 
guidelines, were ECC keys should be twice the length of equivalent strength 
symmetric key algorithms.  The justification for this criterion is from the 
A.3.1.2    Brief Definition of Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters 
 
Essentially, elliptic curve domain parameters consist of an elliptic curve E (with 
associated underlying field and a fixed representation for the underlying field), 
and a base point generator G, which is a point on E. 
 
The order n of the generator G is also part of the domain parameters.  In this 
standard, n shall be prime.  The cofactor is h = (#E)/n, and is an optional part of 
the domain parameters. 
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birthday attack, whose complexity is 2n/2.  Hence, a 224-bit ECC key is 
equivalent to a 112 bit symmetric key [4,7].   
 
The following table shows the approved associated security levels and the 
corresponding minimum and maximum for the order of the elliptic curve.  
 
Security Level Greater than Less than 
80 2160 2223 
112 2223 2255 
128 2255 2383 
192 2383 2511 
256 2511 ∞ 
Figure 10: Approved Security Level and Bound for the Order 
(ANSI X9.62-2005, A.3.1.4) [22] 
 
Federal Standards for Domain Parameters 
 
The U.S. standards for elliptic curve domain parameters are available in 
several published resources, such as ANSI X9.62, IEEE P1363, NIST FIPS 
186-2, and SEC-2.  In the 2005 published ANSI standard, the parameters 
defined include the NIST published standards.  The 1998 version of the 
standard failed to synchronize the parameters identified, and therefore failed 
to become a standard [22].  The Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC-2) 
publication from Certicom consolidated the standards that were identified in 
September 2000 [24]. 
 
Some of the other organizations that provide standards for the domain 
parameters for elliptic curves are echeck, IPSec, ISO and WAP, according to 
the SEC-2 publication [24].  There are several cases where the parameters 
match in terms of the bit size.  IEEE and IPSec provide additional lower order 
parameters. 
 
Size ANSI IEEE NIST 
113 - X - 
131 - X - 
163 X X X 
193 X X - 
233 X X X 
239 X X - 
283 X X X 
409 X X X 
571 X X X 
Figure 11: Elliptic Curve Standard Sizes and the U.S. Standards Entity [24] 
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In the United States, ANSI is used as an organization for retaining and 
distributing standards that originate from other entities, so as to confirm that 
the standards used are those associated with doing business with the United 
States.  Where as IEEE and NIST are organizations that create and publish 
national standards.  For more detail on the associated domain parameters in 
binary Galois fields, Appendix 2 has the full set of the NIST parameters [35]. 
 
For binary Galois fields, within a polynomial basis, the approved reduction 
polynomials are provided in the table below.  These particular polynomials 
were chosen because they are ideally suited for use in fast-reduction 
algorithms, which are used to accelerate the mathematics associated with ECC 
[1, 22].  
 
 
Field Reduction Polynomial 
F2113 f(x) = x
113  + x9 + 1 
F2131 f(x) = x
131  + x8 + x3 + x2 + 1 
F2163 f(x) = x
163  + x7 + x6 + x3 + 1 
F2193 f(x) = x
193  + x15 + 1 
F2233 f(x) = x
233  + x74 + 1 
F2239 f(x) = x
239  + x36 + 1 
F2283 f(x) = x
283  + x12 + x7 + x5 + 1 
F2409 f(x) = x
409  + x87 + 1 
F2571 f(x) = x
571  + x10 + x5 + x2 + 1 
 
Figure 12: Reduction Polynomials in Binary Galois Fields [22] 
 
International Standards  
 
NIST and IEEE are not the only organizations that have defined elliptic curve 
standards.  In the international community, organizations such as ISO/IEC, 
have determined standards in conjunction with NIST, IEEE, and ANSI.  These 
organizations are a part of the Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, 
SECG.  This group works on operability and compatibility issues between all 
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Algorithm for Generating Parameters 
 
There are a few stages in the generation process for randomly verifiable 
domain parameters.  They can be calculated pseudo-randomly, as is described 
below, or they can be selected from the NIST and IEEE standards, looked up 













Figure 13: Ways to Obtain the Domain Parameters 
 
 
The parameters, as mentioned in the previous chapter are the following: 
 
1. m = field size and power or the leading x of the    
 irreducible polynomial 
2. f(x) = irreducible polynomial modulus for polynomial basis 
3. a = coefficient for the elliptic curve equation 
4. b = coefficient for the elliptic curve equation 
5. P = (xp, yp), a point on the elliptic curve 
6. n = the order of the point, P 
7. h = the cofactor, such that h = #E(F (2m) )/ n 
h ∈ { 2, 4 } 
8. s = seed for the hash function for random parameter generation  
 
Since obtaining the domain parameters from approved, published standards is 
quite simplistic, the generation of verifiably random parameters will be 
examined in this chapter.  The following figure shows that steps involved in 




























Figure 14: Steps in Obtaining the Domain Parameters[22] 
 
 
Verifiably Random Domain Parameters 
 
The first step in the generation of domain parameters is the generating of the 
appropriate elliptic curve.    An elliptic curve in binary Galois fields requires 
values for a and b, and that b does not equal 0.  This is done with the use of a 
seed value, an approved hash function with an output of length t, and 
identifying field size for this set of parameters.  The field size is related to the 
chosen security level.  At a minimum, the field size should be ≥ 2163, where 
163 denotes the smallest NIST standard value. 
 
The following is a listing of the steps in obtaining the Elliptic Curve.  It is 












Generating a Verifiably 
Random Elliptic Curve 
Determining the Order 
of the Elliptic Curve 
Generating a Base Point 
on the Elliptic Curve 
Primality Testing 
Algorithm 








Figure 15: Algorithm for Generating Verifiably Random Elliptic Curves[22] 
 
The criteria for elliptic curve generation are that m is a prime, and that the 
security of the hash function must be equal to or greater than the overall 
security level desired by the user.  The value of m is very small, and 
confirming m is a prime is trivial. 
              
The hash functions that are available, currently, are SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-
384, and SHA-512 [34].  Until the SHS changes, these are the available 
algorithms to be implemented, and currently are implemented in Certicom’s 
software package which implements ECC for the federal standards [20, 21, 
40]. 
 
Determining the Order for the Elliptic Curve 
 
Determining the order, n, for an elliptic curve requires a means by which to 
count the number of points associated with the curve.  Koblitz curves also 
utilize a cofactor term, whose value is either 2 or 4.  This is essential so as to 
be able to compute the base point of the associated elliptic curve.  By Hasse’s 
theorem[6], the number of points follows the following equation: 
1. Let 
! 













k = m " s # t  if q is even, and for binary Galois fields, it is. 
4. Compute H = HASH (Seed) where the hash function is approved as 
a Secure Hash Standard (SHS) 
5. Convert H to an integer e, using data conversion techniques. 







7. For j from 1 to s, let 
! 
c j = HASH((Seed + j)mod2
g , where g is bit-














9. Convert c to a field element r 
• This is done by taking the hex-value of c  and converting to 
a bit string of length m. 
10. Choose an element a of the field F (2m).  For all of the NIST 
approved parameters, this value, a = 1. 















In order to compute the value accurately, efficient point counting algorithms 
need to be implemented.  A criterion for the order is that the order is a prime 
number.  This is confirmed with an efficient primality-testing algorithm. The 
types of primality testing available and used in the standards will be discussed 
shortly. 
Point-Counting and Calculating Order 
 
The simplest method for computing the order of an elliptic curve is by 
implementation of an algorithm based on a Lucas Sequence [8].  A Lucas 
Sequence solves for a value based on previously computed values, similarly as 
a recursion.  Just as in a recursion there is a base case, point counting in binary 
Galois fields has a base case for the computation.  Theorem 4.12 [6] computes 
the number of points on an elliptic curve for F(qm) given that F(q) can be 
solved easily.  For binary Galois fields, q = 2, and the first portion of the 











For the number of points on the elliptic curve on F(q), where q is prime, the 
points that satisfy the elliptic curve equation with the modulus of the field.  
The points on  
E : y2 + xy = x3+ ax2 + 1 
 
in F(2) are as follows for the condition that a = 0, or a = 1. 
 
E(F(2)) = { (∞, ∞),  (0, 0),  (0 , 1),  (1, 0),  (1, 1) } 
 
THEOREM 4.12 
Let #E(F(q)) = q + 1 – µ.  Write X2 – aX + q  = (X - α)(X - β).  Then 
 
#E(F(qn)) = qn + 1 – (αn + βn) 
 
for all n ≥ 1. 
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The maximum number of points is five, and the subset always has (∞, ∞) as 
one of the allowable points.  For binary Galois fields, elliptic curve equations 
are of the form:  
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b 
For NIST approved curves, a = 1 and b is a randomly verifiable integer, not 
equal to zero, or a predefined value from the federal standards.  For Koblitz 
curves, the elliptic curve has b = 1, and a is an element of {0, 1}. 
 
In order to solve (αn + βn), from Theorem 4.12, an associated lemma is 






Rearranging the base equation from theorem 4.12: 
 
µ =q + 1 –  #E(F(q)) = s1  
 
Utilizing lemma 4.13 and theorem 4.12 computes the number of points on the 
elliptic curves of higher degree.  
 
LEMMA 4.13 




E: y2 + xy = x3 + 1x2 + b for F(2163) 
 
If b mod 2 = 1, then E(F(q)) = { (∞, ∞), (0 , 1) }.  This is used to 
solve for µ.     
µ =2 + 1 – 2 = 1 = s1 
 
If b mod 2 = 0, then E(F(q)) = { (∞, ∞), (0, 0),  (1, 0),  (1, 1) } 
In this case:     
µ =2 + 1 – 4 = -1 = s1 
  
 Therefore, if µ = 1, then s0 = 2, s1 = 1, and sn+1 = sn - 2sn-1. 
  s2 = s1 - 2s0 = (-1) – 2( 2) = -3  
  s3 = s2 - 2s1 = (-3) – 2(-1) = -5 
  s4 = s3 - 2s2 = (-5) – 2(-3) =  1 
  … 
  s163 = s162 - 2s161 = - 4845466632539410776804317 
 
#E(F(2163)) = 2163 + 1 – s163 
 
   







There are other methods for point counting in Galois fields.  The Schoof 
algorithm, established in 1985, is a slow, polynomial time algorithm.  Others 
have developed much quicker algorithms for general fields.  These other 
algorithms are: 
 
Schoof, Elkies, Atkins Algorithm [7, 28, 36] 
AGM – Arithmetic Geometric Mean [1, 32] 
SST – Satoh, Skjernaa, Taguchi algorithm [1, 29, 32] 
MSST – Modified Satoh, Skjernaa, Taguchi algorithm [32] 
 
These algorithms would certainly provide the necessary results for point 
counting, however for binary Galois fields, these provide much more 
computational capability than is necessary.   
 
Primality Testing Algorithms 
 
There are several algorithms that have been developed for computing the 
primality of a number, some more efficient than others.  The one utilized by 
the federal standards is the Miller-Rabin primality test [22], which was 
developed in 1985.  This is also known as a “Strong Pseudoprimality Test” 
[7].  This algorithm has a O (log n)3 runtime, which considerably better than 
the others.  However, it does erroneously identify a number as a prime with a 
Example (continued):  
   
      11692013098647223345629478661730264157247460343808  
        + 1  
                                            - (- 4845466632539410776804317) 
      11692013098647223345629483507196896696658237148126 
 
The order is a large value that is prime.  Obviously, since this 
number is even, it is not prime.  Dividing this result by 2 confirms 
that 2 is the cofactor and the order is a prime whose value is:  
 
order = 5846006549323611672814741753598448348329118574063 




small degree of error, given by the equation below, where k is the number of 








This error probability is better than the Euler’s Pseudoprimaility Test, by a 
factor of 2k. 
 
Other algorithms are utilized to reduce this error probability, but do so in an 
inefficient manner.  The Goldwasser-Kilian Algorithm was developed in 
1988, however its’ runtime is O (log n)10+c , where c is a constant.  This 
algorithm also attempts to implement the Schoof Point Counting Algorithm 
[7]. 
 
In Atkin and Morain’s 1993, publication “Elliptic Curves and Primality 
Proving,” they developed a new algorithm which avoids the problems of the 
Goldwasser-Kilian algorithm.  It is simply referred to as ECPP, Elliptic 
Curves Primality Proving.  Its’ runtime is O (log n)6+ε.  It is the combination 
of the Miller-Rabin algorithm and the ECPP algorithm that constitute the 
Practical Primality Test [7].  ECPP is a zero-error probabilistic test, which can 
be utilized to verify the Miller-Rabin test.  The Miller-Rabin and the ECPP 
tests have different runtimes.  The Practical Primality Test implements both of 
these methods as means to validate the value. If a number under test passes 
both of these conditions, it is confirmed to be a prime number.  Since the 
Miller-Rabin can confirm a number is composite, a prime value may not 
necessarily be a prime.  Therefore, ECPP can be utilized to verify primality, 
and only be used for questionable cases since its runtime is larger than that of 
Miller-Rabin. 
 
Generating the Base Point 
 
The base point is a point on the designated elliptic curve.  For verifiably 
random elliptic curves, a seed value is used, and the standard algorithm 
provided by ANSI is used for creating the base point.  Otherwise, one can use 
the values provided in the NIST and IEEE standards.  The following is a step-
by-step description of the algorithm for which a seed is used from the ANSI 
X9.62-2005 standard [22].   
 
The necessary input parameters are E=(F(2m), a, b), the cofactor h, a prime n, 
and a bit string Seed. 
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Figure 16: Base Point Generation (ANSI X9.62-2005)[22] 
 
 
By computing the base point, the final values, which are characterized as the 
domain parameters have been calculated.  These values now can be utilized 
for elliptic curve cryptography, digital signatures, and authentication. 
 
 
Validating Domain Parameters 
 
The validation of the elliptic curve domain parameters can be simplified into 
two categories; validating an Elliptic Curve, and validating a Base Point. 
 
The validation of the elliptic curve has four criteria for binary Galois fields 
[22].   
 
• The field must be of the form F(2m), where m = prime. 
• The coefficients of the curve, a and b, when converted to binary must 
have a bit-length of m bits. 
1. Set base = 1 
2. Set element = 1 
3. Convert base and element to octet strings Base and Element, 
respectively 
4. Compute H = HASH (“Base Point” || Base || Element || Seed) 
where the hash function is approved as a Secure Hash Standard 
(SHS) 



















$  then increment element and go back to step 3. 
7. Let 
! 
t = emod2q; such that 
! 
{t " N | 
! 
0 " t " 2q #1} 
8. Let 
! 











9. Choose an element x of the field F(2m). 
10. Recover the field element, y, using point compression over binary 
fields from (x, z).  The point compression algorithm utilizes 
functions for calculating the quadratic of a binary Galois field, and 
a Half-Trace function for polynomial basis calculations. 
11. With x and y, the point P has been calculated. 
 30 
• The value of b ≠ 0. 
• The seed used to generate the curve must match the seed provided. 
 
Validation of a base point has some additional constraints [22]. 
 
• The base point, P, is not the infinity point. 
• G = hP, where P = (xP , yP), and h is the cofactor. 
• P = (xP , yP), and each component has bit-length equal to m. 
• (xP , yP) must satisfy the associated elliptic curve equation. 
• nP = ∞. 
• If G is not a valid base point then increment base and go back to Step 
2 in the base-point generation algorithm, unless base > 10h2, in which 
case, output "Failure". 
• If P is generated randomly, utilize the parameters (h, n, seed) to 
recreate the base point, and compare with the value received.  These 
values should match. 
• Verify that the MOV and Anomalous conditions are met. 
 
In the current version of the ANSI standard, X9.62-2005, the generation and 
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Pseudo-Random Number Generation 
 
For utilization of the verifiably random parameter generation process, a 
pseudo-random number generator is used to select a suitable value for the 
Seed variable, which is implemented with the hash algorithm.  The Seed is 
used in both the elliptic curve generation process and the base point 
generation [22].   
 
FIPS-186-2 provides and algorithm for random number generation by 
utilization of the SHS.  Of the values used as Seed values, NIST and IEEE 
specify seeds that have a bit-length equal to that of the output of the hash 
algorithm, which is stated to be SHA-1 in the standard.  The criterion states 
that the Seed shall have a minimum bit-length of 160 bits. Each Seed consists 
of five words when using SHA-1, where each word is 32-bits in length [35].   
 
 
Security Level and Degree of the Field 
 
The value of the security level defines the strength of the elliptic curve 
encryption algorithm.  The particular binary field is chosen such that the order 
bit-length is “at least twice key length of common symmetric-key block 
ciphers.”[24] This applies whether it is for polynomial basis, normal basis, or 
Koblitz curves.  Furthermore, values for m are prime numbers [26].   
 
Symmetric cipher key 
length 
Example Algorithm Dimension of m of 
binary field F(2m) 
80 SKIPJACK 163 
112 Triple-DES 233 
128 AES – Small 283 
192 AES – Medium 409 
256 AES – Large 571 
Figure 17: Symmetric Key Length and Field Size Comparison[26] 
 
There is also a condition of the dimension m chosen, and this is that a Koblitz 
curve of almost prime order must exist.  Determining if a Koblitz curve exists 
is directly calculated in a short amount of time.  There are other prime values 
of m having associated Koblitz curves, but were not selected by NIST and 
IEEE.  Only those that are compared to the symmetric ciphers were chosen.   
Appendix D shows other degrees within the NIST range, and their respective 
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Koblitz curve orders with their cofactors.  Additional values for m beyond the 
571 field were also calculated.  Therefore, the next choice of polynomial basis  
Galois field would be 701.  This would provide a larger value for m with more 
security. The figure below shows a comparison for the key size that is 
necessary to yield that same level of security.  A 160-bit ECC key is 















Figure 18: ECC to RSA Key Length Comparison[4] 
 
A 701-bit ECC key would exceed the current security standards, yet still be 
able to utilize the fast reduction algorithms available for the standards.   The 
associated irreducible polynomial is as follows. 
 
f(x) = x701 + x16 + x4 + x2 + 1 
 
Fast reduction algorithms have been defined for the five federal standards and 
have an upper limit of 1140.  They allow compatibility with the standards 





The entire implementation of generating elliptic curve parameters utilizes 32-
bit architecture.  It is exemplified in all aspects of the process.  It is utilized for 
the hash algorithm, modular reduction, and polynomial multiplication [22]. 
 
Many new computers are manufactured with 64-bit architecture, such as the 
Apple MacBook.  Currently, not many resources would benefit from higher 
 RSA/DSA  
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bit architecture in regards to needed memory allocation, mapping, and reverse 
compatibility issues.  Therefore, unless a specific application requires higher 
bit architecture, the current implementations are quite sufficient.  The only 
exception is the pending elimination of the SHA-1 hash algorithm.  SHA-256, 
SHA-384, and SHA-512 are very beneficial, and will provide the needed 
hashing of data for a long time, until SHA-3 is chosen to replace existing hash 
functions as a new standard in 2012 [19, 20]. 
 
 
Selection of Basis 
 
The selection of the basis to use for generation of parameters is not 
tremendously critical, between polynomial and normal bases.  These two 
bases can be used interchangeably by means of a conversion algorithm. 
NIST and IEEE specify the necessary conversion value that is used to create 
an m-by-m conversion matrix.  Unique standard sets of values are provided to 
convert from a normal basis to polynomial, and vice versa.  The most ideal 
choice for implementations is the Koblitz curves, due their efficiency [22, 35]. 
 
Fast reduction 
For polynomial basis computations, mathematical computations are performed 
with the modulus of the irreducible polynomial.  However, even with 
selection of a different field size, the mathematic functions can be “reduced” 
so as to use the modulus associated with the five NIST standards [1]. 
 
Binary polynomial size <325 <465 <565 <817 <1140 
NIST Field 163 233 283 409 571 
 
Based on the available fast reduction algorithms, no field size greater than 
1140 can be used.  However, reduction can be calculated for fields of size  
2m-2 by a modular reduction algorithm which calculates the reduction on a 
bit-by-bit level [1].  The available fast reduction algorithms are implemented 
on word lengths of 32-bits.   
 
A 64-bit implementation would not double the efficiency of the elliptic curve 
algorithms.  Memory overhead and lack of compatibility with 32-bit systems 
are a drawback to current usage.  Associated loops in the reduction algorithms 
would be halved, but the bitwise operations would increase, if one were to 
repeat the procedure for the existing standard fields.  With 64-bit architecture, 
larger field sizes may be considered, and weighing the considerations of 
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security and computing time would be essential.  64-bit instructions, with the 
increased length have a decrease in decoding rate [30]. 
 
Selection of Hash Algorithm 
 
The choice of the hash algorithm to be implemented for the generation of 
domain parameters is dependent on the security level desired by the user.  The 
federal standards identify SHA-1 as the hash used for the generation of the 
standard domain parameters.  However, with the eventual elimination of 
SHA-1, it would be beneficial to implement other, more stable hash functions 
in the interim.  It would also be beneficial to choose a field size comparable in 
security level to that of the hash function. 
 
Field Size SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512 
Hash Output Size 160 256 384 512 
Field Size 163, 233 283 409 571 
Figure 19: Utilization of Other Existing Hash Functions 
 
This recommendation would be applicable until 2012 when a new hash 
standard will be determined, SHA-3.  Note that only the hashs defined by 
FIPS 180-2 are identified.  SHA-224 is identified in the FIPS 180-3 





The MOV attack is named so after Menezes, Okamoto, and Vanstone.  It is an 
attack on an elliptic curve by a reduction of the discrete log problem to the 
finite field, F(qB).  Hence for binary Galois fields, F(2B).  The coefficient, B, 
is the MOV threshold.  Selection of a relatively large value for the threshold 
must prove to results in a difficult discrete logarithmic problem over F(2). 
The MOV threshold in the federal standards dictates that B ≥ 100 [22, 35]. 
 
Since NIST provides standards whose degrees of their respective fields are at 
least 163, the MOV criterion is satisfied.  Hence, degrees smaller than 100 can 
not be chosen as viable choices for the purposes of secure parameter 
generation and validation. 
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Anomalous Condition 
Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem in anomalous curves have been 
shown to be easily solved. The anomalous condition is achieved when the 
number of points on an elliptic curve, in a designated field does not equal the 




Most elliptic curves over a field F(2m) will indeed satisfy the Anomalous 
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In understanding the associated procedures and constraints with generating 
randomly verifiable parameters, certain algorithms from the ANSI standard 
were utilized.  Implementation of the algorithms was done in Java, and in 
some cases utilizing existing code, such as the Schoof algorithm [7, 14]. 
 
Generating Elliptic Curve 
 
Implementation of the randomly verifiable elliptic curve generator from ANSI 
[22] proved to be quite challenging mainly due to the multiple data 
conversions necessary.  The associated code was a modification to a 
compilation of some readily available applications.  The Java code 
implementing the SHA-1 hash came from www. anyexample.com [15]. This 
code provided the baseline on which to build the generator program.   
 
In implementation of the generation algorithm, it became apparent that 
utilizing other hash functions is done simply by substituting the existing 
specified hash for another hash function of choice.  SHA-256, SHA-384, and 
SHA-512 can be specified directly, and they adhere to the SHS [15].  
 
As a means to confirm the program was functioning properly, and would 
generate the appropriate results, the NIST approved value for the Seed for the 
163-bit ECC domain parameters was used.  The output that resulted was the 
NIST specified value for the b coefficient, in Normal Basis.  Conversion to a 
polynomial basis requires the creation of the conversion matrix, as well as the 
calculations of the associated roots, in the proper basis.  This procedure 
includes the roots of the irreducible polynomial equation.  For the standards 
that exist, the creation of the conversion matrix is simplified by multiplying 
and reducing the critical rows of data to make the matrix.  This particular 





n = 1 0 1 0[ ]
" =
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0













n ) " = 0 1 1 0[ ]mod(2)
 
Using this simple example enforces the understanding that a larger scale 
conversion, such as that for the NIST 163-bit value for b. will yield [35]: 
 
b = 6645f3cacf1638e139c6cd13ef61734fbc9e3d9fb (Normal) 
 
b = 20a601907b8c953ca1481eb10512f78744a3205fd (Polynomial) 
 
 
With the confirmation that the value for b was computed correctly, a 
randomly generated seed was calculated using Matlab.  The function is shown 
below.   
 
 
In addition to the random seed, a different field size was chosen, one whose 
Koblitz curve exists, but is not one of the standard five dataset.  The degree of 
the field chosen was 311.  The results of the curve generation are provided in 
the following chapter. 
 
 
Computing the Order 
 
Similarly, as with the curve generator, a known test case was first used to 
confirm the functionality and correctness of the Schoof program, which was 
available from www.shamus.ie [14].  The consideration with using the 
function prng 
  
n = 16; 
f = dec2hex(ceil(n.*rand(40,1))-1); 
out = f(1:40)' 
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“schoof2.exe” program is that the input is in polynomial basis [14].  This was 
confirmed by testing the NIST data as input.  This implementation of the 
Schoof algorithm took several minutes for the 163-bit input.  Larger input 
takes on the order of hours to days to complete. 
 
The long calculation time lead to examining another algorithm, one based on a 
Lucas sequence [6, 8].  This worked very well in computing the elliptic curve 
order in a matter of seconds.  Its only input was the size of the field, m.  The 
condition associated with this algorithm, is that it only applies for small prime 
numbers, q, for F(qm).  In the case of binary Galois fields, q = 2.  The 
algorithm computes the order for the base point of the Koblitz curves.  This 
was confirmed by testing various input values, and comparing the result with 
known result in [1].   
 
The benefit of this algorithm is that it can confirm orders quickly for Koblitz 
curves, and in so doing, it provides other field sizes for non-Koblitz binary 
Galois elliptic curves.  This also becomes an advantage if Koblitz curves are 
actually needed in regards to a hardware implementation.  Appendix D shows 
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Results of Implementation 
 
For implementation of the curve-generating algorithm, the program was tested 
on known values in order to confirm that it was generating the corresponding 
coefficients of the elliptic curve.  The test case was for m=163 from NIST 
[35].  Using the associated seed value for the hash function, and an 
implementation of SHA-1 hash, it confirmed that the output generated was the 
coefficients in normal basis.  All values shown below are in hexadecimal 
notation except eVal, which is a decimal conversion from the hexadecimal 
hash output. 
 
All of the validation criteria for generating a randomly verifiable elliptic curve 
are met.  Utilizing the polynomial basis version of the curve coefficients 
allowed for confirmation of Schoof’s algorithm for computing the order of the 




Results of Case Study 
 
For a randomly verifiable case study, a prime number was chosen such that its 
value would not be one of the five NIST approved parameters; an irreducible 
polynomial can be utilized for fast reduction. The degree of the field was 
chosen also, so that it would be a prime that has a Koblitz curve order, which 
is not specified by NIST or IEEE.  The value for m is 311. 
 
Binary Field (2311) 
m=311 
a=1 
f(z) = z311 + z7 + z5 + z3 + 1 
 
A quick implementation of a pseudo-random number generator allowed for 
the creation of a 160-bit seed value. 
Seed: = 85e25bfe5c86226cdb12016f7553f9d0e693a268 
Hash: = 1a241ca0a0e671a2dce5df94340cfdf886707b66 
eVal: = 149239080671624739118878978253419955063463377766 
 
Normal Basis 
a        = 00000000000000000000000000000000000000001 
b        = 6645f3cacf1638e139c6cd13ef61734fbc9e3d9fb 
b length = 163 
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s = 0x FA7D88A5 39D62746 D6652416 44617B3C 16030324 
 
Taking the randomly generated seed and using it as the input for the elliptic 
curve generator, setting m = 311, and using the SHA-1 hash algorithm, results 
in the following value for the b-coefficient.  The a-coefficient was set to 1, so 
as to be identical to the NIST format. 
 
b = 0x 004087c3 91766f31 86287017 ed2aa5a0 743d6c8e  
a5408fd0 e4685d67 48182e94 09c07c76 cf66484c 
 




Once again, the criteria for valid elliptic curve generation are met.  The 
coefficients have bit-length equal to m, which is a prime number, and neither 
coefficient is 0.  The seed, which generated the coefficients, is provided 
allowing for verification of the parameters.   
 
Determining higher order fields were also computed for cases where a Koblitz 
curve of the form y2 + xy = x3+ x2 + 1 exists.  Prime numbers were chosen 
above the maximum NIST value of 571.  The first three primes that met this 
criterion were 701, 1153, and 1249.  The bit-length for the order of these 
fields is growing comparable to RSA, and exceeds the 1024 minimum RSA 
requirement.  The standard reduction algorithms have an upper limit of 1140 
bits, however higher order fields can be used with the implementation of a bit-




Seed: = FA7D88A539D62746D665241644617B3C16030324 
Hash: = a2c087c391766f3186287017ed2aa5a0743d6c8e 
eVal: = 929150074658595225474527593156946520741668285582 
 
Normal Basis 
a        = 
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000001 
b        = 
4087c391766f3186287017ed2aa5a0743d6c8ea5408fd0e4685d6748182
e9409c07c76cf66484c 





Implementation of the algorithms must be done with extreme attention and 
focus on the basis that one is working with, as well as conversions.  Since the 
SHS and ECC parameters are based on 32-bit word lengths, this is ideal for 
the older computer processors and future processors.   This allows for ECC 
algorithms to be backwards compatible with previous versions.  The 64-bit 
processors are gradually becoming more common, as will the software. This 
includes the encryption packages that need to be written for this architecture. 
 
In regards to the NIST standards for parameters, for immediate 
implementation with key-pair generation, the readily available parameters are 
ideal.  Creation of custom parameters requires a through understanding of the 
application and whether it is to be implemented in software or hardware.  For 




• Pseudo-Random Seed for hash functions of bit-length equal to the 
degree of the field, even though the hash functions pad the seed. 
• For NIST requirement, a = 1, and b ≠ 0 having bit-length equal to the 
degree of the field.  For Koblitz curves, b = {0, 1} 
• Hash algorithm must have a security level greater than or equal to the 
security level of the elliptic curve field degree, with the understanding 
that the SHA-1 hash function should be eliminated as a standard, and 
replaced with the SHA-256 function defined in FIPS 180-2 until the 
new SHS is determined and released publically. 
• Computing the necessary orders should be performed using the most 
efficient algorithms available, such as SST, AGM, or MSST.  
However, the method used for Koblitz curves is beneficial to select 
other field degrees. 
• Conversion algorithms and fast reduction algorithms should be readily 








Further research would consist of implementation of the most recent 
algorithms, such as the MSST algorithm so as to compute the order very 
quickly for general fields. As the newest standard hash algorithm becomes 
published, implementation of the hash with the elliptic curve parameter 
generating algorithms, and testing will be essential for compatibility with the 
elliptic curve domain parameter generation procedures. 
 
In order for simplified user access to the generation of parameters, a robust 
GUI could be developed so as to select the criteria for the elliptic curve 
parameters.  Everything from security level, hash algorithm, standard NIST 
parameters or randomly verifiable ones should be readily selectable for the 
end-user.  This can also be utilized as a learning tool.  Algorithms associated 
with fast reduction and modular reduction should also be implemented.  With 
an entire set of algorithms and features, an application package could be 
developed for commercial use on multiple platforms. 
 
It would also be of interest to implement algorithms that do not reduce field 
elements to the five NIST standards, but rather are completely generic based 
on field selection, only. 
 
Lastly, a recommendation should be made to NIST and IEEE, that the 163 and 
233 bit domain parameters either use a stronger hash function as standard, or 











Appendix A – Abbreviations 
 
ANSI  American National Standards Institute 
 
DSA  Digital Signature Algorithm 
 
DSS  Digital Signature Scheme 
 
ECC  Elliptic Curve Cryptography/Cryptosystem 
 
ECPP  Elliptic Curve Primality Proving 
 
GF  Galois Field, also denoted F 
 
GNB  Gaussian Normal Basis 
 
IEEE  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
 
MSST  Modified Satoh-Skjernaa-Taguchi point counting algorithm 
 
NIST  National Institute of Standards and Technology 
 
PPB  Pentanomial Polynomial Basis 
 
RSA   Rivest, Shamir, Adleman 
 
SEA  Schoof-Elkies-Atkin point counting algorithm 
 
SHA  Secure Hash Algorithm 
 
SHS  Secure Hash Standard 
 
SST  Satoh-Skjernaa-Taguchi point counting algorithm 
 
TPB  Trinomial Polynomial Basis 
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Appendix B – NIST Standards 
The following values are the NIST recommended standard parameters for 
elliptic curves over binary fields in a polynomial basis and normal basis.  The 
NIST standards are for bit lengths of 163, 233, 283, 409, and 571.  These 
same bit lengths are utilized by Kolbitz Elliptic Curves, for which the 
parameters are uniquely specific.  The conversion algorithm for converting 
from a polynomial to a normal basis, or vice versa, is provided in FIPS 186-2 
as well as other standards [22, 26, 35]. 
 
 m    the extension degree of the binary field (GF(2m)) 
a,b   the coefficients of the elliptic curve equation:  
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b 
 f(z)    the irreducible polynomial of degree m 
s   seed value for randomly generating the coefficients of 
the elliptic curve 
 r  base point order 
 h   the cofactor 
 xG, yG  the (x, y) value for the base point, G 
 




f(z) = z163 + z7 + z6 + z3 + 1 
s = 0x 85e25bfe 5c86226c db12016f 7553f9d0 e693a268 
r =   5846006549323611672814742442876390689256843201587 
 
Polynomial Basis: 
b  = 0x 2 0a601907 b8c953ca 1481eb10 512f7874 4a3205fd 
xG = 0x 3 f0eba162 86a2d57e a0991168 d4994637 e8343e36 
yG = 0x   d51fbc6c 71a0094f a2cdd545 b11c5c0c 797324f1 
 
Normal Basis: 
b  = 0x 6 645f3cac f1638e13 9c6cd13e f61734fb c9e3d9fb 
xG = 0x   311103c1 7167564a ce77ccb0 9c681f88 6ba54ee8 
yG = 0x 3 33ac13c6 447f2e67 613bf700 9daf98c8 7bb50c7f 
 





f(z) = z233 + z74 + 1 
s = 0x 74d59ff0 7f6b413d 0ea14b34 4b20a2db 049b50c3 




b  = 0x 00000066 647ede6c 332c7f8c 0923bb58 213b333b 
20e9ce42 81fe115f 7d8f90ad 
xG = 0x 000000fa c9dfcbac 8313bb21 39f1bb75 5fef65bc 
391f8b36 f8f8eb73 71fd558b 
yG = 0x 00000100 6a08a419 03350678 e58528be bf8a0bef 
f867a7ca 36716f7e 01f81052 
 
Normal Basis: 
b  = 0x 000001a0 03e0962d 4f9a8e40 7c904a95 38163adb 
82521260 0c7752ad 52233279 
xG = 0x 0000018b 863524b3 cdfefb94 f2784e0b 116faac5 
4404bc91 62a363ba b84a14c5 
yG = 0x 00000049 25df77bd 8b8ff1a5 ff519417 822bfedf 
2bbd7526 44292c98 c7af6e02 
 




f(z) = z283 + z12 + z7 + z5 + 1 
s  = 0x 77e2b073 70eb0f83 2a6dd5b6 2dfc88cd 06bb84be 




b  = 0x 027b680a c8b8596d a5a4af8a 19a0303f ca97fd76 
45309fa2 a581485a f6263e31 3b79a2f5 
xG = 0x 05f93925 8db7dd90 e1934f8c 70b0dfec 2eed25b8 
557eac9c 80e2e198 f8cdbecd 86b12053 
yG = 0x 03676854 fe24141c b98fe6d4 b20d02b4 516ff702 
350eddb0 826779c8 13f0df45 be8112f4 
 
Normal Basis: 
b  = 0x 0157261b 894739fb 5a13503f 55f0b3f1 0c560116 
66331022 01138cc1 80c0206b dafbc951 
xG = 0x 0749468e 464ee468 634b21f7 f61cb700 701817e6 
bc36a236 4cb8906e 940948ea a463c35d 
yG = 0x 062968bd 3b489ac5 c9b859da 68475c31 5bafcdc4 
ccd0dc90 5b70f624 46f49c05 2f49c08c 
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f(z) = z409 + z87 + 1 
s = 0x 4099b5a4 57f9d69f 79213d09 4c4bcd4d 4262210b 





b  = 0x 0021a5c2 c8ee9feb 5c4b9a75 3b7b476b 7fd6422e 
f1f3dd67 4761fa99 d6ac27c8 a9a197b2 72822f6c 
d57a55aa 4f50ae31 7b13545f 
xG = 0x 015d4860 d088ddb3 496b0c60 64756260 441cde4a 
f1771d4d b01ffe5b 34e59703 dc255a86 8a118051 
5603aeab 60794e54 bb7996a7 
yG = 0x 0061b1cf ab6be5f3 2bbfa783 24ed106a 7636b9c5 
a7bd198d 0158aa4f 5488d08f 38514f1f df4b4f40 
d2181b36 81c364ba 0273c706 
 
Normal Basis: 
b  = 0x 0024d065 1c3d3772 f7f5a1fe 6e715559 e2129bdf 
a04d52f7 b6ac7c53 2cf0ed06 f610072d 88ad2fdc 
c50c6fde 72843670 f8b3742a 
xG = 0x 00ceacbc 9f475767 d8e69f3b 5dfab398 13685262 
bcacf22b 84c7b6dd 981899e7 318c96f0 761f77c6 
02c016ce d7c548de 830d708f 
yG = 0x 0199d64b a8f089c6 db0e0b61 e80bb959 34afd0ca 
f2e8be76 d1c5e9af fc7476df 49142691 ad303902 
88aa09bc c59c1573 aa3c009a 
 




f(z) = z571 + z10 + z5 + z2 + 1 
s  = 0x 2aa058f7 3a0e33ab 486b0f61 0410c53a 7f132310 







b  = 0x 02f40e7e 2221f295 de297117 b7f3d62f 5c6a97ff 
cb8ceff1 cd6ba8ce 4a9a18ad 84ffabbd 8efa5933 
2be7ad67 56a66e29 4afd185a 78ff12aa 520e4de7 
39baca0c 7ffeff7f 2955727a 
xG = 0x 0303001d 34b85629 6c16c0d4 0d3cd775 0a93d1d2 
955fa80a a5f40fc8 db7b2abd bde53950 f4c0d293 
cdd711a3 5b67fb14 99ae6003 8614f139 4abfa3b4 
c850d927 e1e7769c 8eec2d19 
yG = 0x 037bf273 42da639b 6dccfffe b73d69d7 8c6c27a6 
009cbbca 1980f853 3921e8a6 84423e43 bab08a57 
6291af8f 461bb2a8 b3531d2f 0485c19b 16e2f151 
6e23dd3c 1a4827af 1b8ac15b 
 
Normal Basis: 
b  = 0x 03762d0d 47116006 179da356 88eeaccf 591a5cde 
a7500011 8d9608c5 9132d434 26101a1d fb377411 
5f586623 f75f0000 1ce61198 3c1275fa 31f5bc9f 
4be1a0f4 67f01ca8 85c74777 
xG = 0x 00735e03 5def5925 cc33173e b2a8ce77 67522b46 
6d278b65 0a291612 7dfea9d2 d361089f 0a7a0247 
a184e1c7 0d417866 e0fe0feb 0ff8f2f3 f9176418 
f97d117e 624e2015 df1662a8 
yG = 0x 004a3642 0572616c df7e606f ccadaecf c3b76dab 
0eb1248d d03fbdfc 9cd3242c 4726be57 9855e812 
de7ec5c5 00b4576a 24628048 b6a72d88 0062eed0 





Appendix C – Irreducible Polynomials and Prime 
Numbers  
 
Prime number from 163 ≤ m ≤ 1250 (Generated using MatLab) 
 163           167          173          179          181          191          193          197 
 199           211          223          227          229          233          239          241          
 251           257          263          269          271          277          281          283          
 293           307          311          313          317          331          337          347          
 349           353          359          367          373          379          383          389          
 397           401          409          419          421          431          433          439          
 443           449          457          461          463          467          479          487          
 491           499          503          509          521          523          541          547          
 557           563          569          571          577          587          593          599          
 601           607          613          617          619          631          641          643          
 647           653          659          661          673          677          683          691          
 701           709          719          727          733          739          743          751          
 757           761          769          773          787          797          809          811          
 821           823          827          829          839          853          857          859          
 863           877          881          883          887          907          911          919          
 929           937          941          947          953          967          971          977          
 983           991          997        1009        1013        1019        1021        1031        
1033        1039        1049        1051        1061        1063        1069        1087        
1091        1093        1097        1103        1109        1117        1123        1129        
1151        1153        1163        1171        1181        1187        1193        1201        










m k m k m k 
167 6 487 94 919 36 
191 9 503 3 937 217 
193 15 521 32 953 168 
199 34 569 77 967 36 
223 33 577 25 977 15 
233 74 593 86 983 230 
239 36 599 30 991 39 
241 70 601 201 1009 55 
257 12 607 105 1031 68 
263 93 617 200 1033 108 
271 58 631 307 1039 21 
281 93 641 11 1049 141 
313 79 647 5 1063 168 
337 55 673 28 1087 112 
353 69 719 150 1097 14 
359 68 727 180 1103 65 
367 21 743 90 1129 103 
383 90 751 18 1151 90 
401 152 761 3 1153 241 
409 87 769 120 1193 173 
431 120 809 15 1201 171 
433 33 823 9  1217  393 
439 49 839 54  1223  255 
449 134 857 119 1231 105 
457 16 881 78 1249 187 
463 93 887 147   











k1 +1 [22] 
m (k1, k2, k3) m (k1, k2, k3) 
163 3, 6, 7 677 3, 4, 8 
173 2, 5, 8 683 1, 6, 11 
179 1, 2, 4 691 2, 6, 13 
181 1, 6, 7 701 2, 4, 16 
197 2, 4, 9 709 1, 3, 4 
211 8, 10, 11 733 2, 7, 8 
227 4, 9, 10 739 8, 16, 18 
229 1, 4, 10 757 1, 6, 7 
251 2, 4, 7 773 6, 8, 10 
269 1, 6, 7 787 3, 6, 7 
277 3, 6, 12 797 4, 10, 12 
283 5, 7, 12 811 8, 10, 12 
293 1, 6, 11 821 2, 11, 15 
307 2, 4, 8 827 7, 10, 12 
311 3, 5, 7 829 1, 3, 4 
317 2, 4, 7 853 1, 7, 10 
331 2, 6, 10 859 17, 15, 4 
347 3, 10, 11 863 2, 3, 6 
349 2, 5, 6 877 4, 5, 6 
373 2, 7, 8 883 12, 16, 17 
379 5, 8, 10 907 2, 10, 12 
389 5, 9, 10 929 3, 4, 11 
397 6, 7, 12 941 1, 6, 11 
419 4, 5, 15 947 5, 6, 9 
421 2, 4, 5 971 1, 2, 6 
443 1, 6, 10 997 3, 6, 12 
461 1, 6, 7 1013 6, 8, 9 
467 1, 6, 11 1019 1, 8, 10 
491 3, 6, 11 1021 1, 2, 5 
499 5, 6, 11 1051 10, 12, 13 
509 3, 7, 8 1061 1, 3, 10 
523 2, 6, 13 1069 8, 16, 18 
541 4, 10, 13 1091 5, 10, 12 
547 4, 7, 13 1093 1, 6, 7 
557 5, 6, 7 1109 3, 14,  17 
563 3, 7, 14 1117   4, 10,  12 
571 2, 5, 10 1123 3, 7, 14 
587 1, 6, 11 1163 1, 10, 11 
613 4, 10, 19 1171 1, 5, 6 
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619 5, 8, 9 1181 6, 11, 17 
643 2, 3, 11 1187 4, 8, 13 
653 7, 8, 10 1213 2, 5, 9 
659 2, 4, 15 1229 2, 6, 15 
661 4, 11, 12 1237 4, 6, 10 
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Appendix D – Almost Prime Koblitz Curve Orders  
 
The following is a selection from the table in Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
[1], page 115.  It only shows values not included in the range of the NIST parameters.  
It also shows the cofactors and base point orders for the next three primes 
sequentially that have an E0 or E1 curve, larger than 571. 
 
E0 : y2 + xy = x3 + 1 
E1 : y2 + xy = x3+ x2 + 1 
 
The product of the cofactor and the order is equal to the number of points on the 
elliptic curve. 
h ⋅ n = #E(F(2m)) 
 
m Curve Cofactor Base Point Order 
239 E0 4 2208558830972980411979121875928648149482165
61321709848887480219215362213 
277 E0 4 6070840288205403346623318458823496583257511
0498786508764884175561891622165064650683 
283 E1 2 7770675568902916283677847627294075626569631
244830993521422749282851602622232822777663 
311 E1 2 2085924839766513752338888384931203236916703
6350717111667398912185849163547266542948253
38302183 
331 E1 2 2187250724783011924372502227117621365353169
4308932276434470103067113587125867765885943
43505255614303 
347 E1 2 1433436634993794694756763059563804337997853
1182301756572853742030724076380332577411549
3723193900257029311 
349 E0 4 2866873269987589389513526119127608675995706
2364603514788406744335415307876251189903596
0651549018775044323 












m Curve Cofactor Base Point Order 
























The next larger suitable Koblitz Curve orders are: 1597, 1621, 1913, 2063, 
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